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VII. CONCLUSION .................................. 891THIS Article discusses legislative and judicial developments relat-
ing to the Texas law of intestacy, wills, estate administration,
trusts, and other estate planning matters during the Survey period
of November 1, 2008 through October 31, 2009. The reader is warned
that not all newly enacted statutes and decided cases during the Survey
period are presented, and not all aspects of each cited statute and case
are analyzed. The reader must read and study the full text of each statute
and case before relying on it or using it as precedent. The discussion of
most cases includes a moral, that is, the important lesson to be learned
from the case. By recognizing situations that have resulted in time-con-
suming and costly litigation in the past, the reader may be able to reduce
the likelihood of the same situations arising with his or her clients.
I. THE ESTATES CODE
The 2009 legislature began the process of codifying the current Probate
Code into the new Estates Code.' Although called a "code," the Probate
Code is not a true "code" because it was enacted in 1955, which was
before the 1963 legislature began the process of codifying Texas law into
twenty-seven codes. The codification process is supposed to be nonsub-
stantive and instead is a recodification only.2 The portion of the Estates
Code passed by the 2009 legislature focuses on intestacy, wills, and estate
administration. The plan is to add the guardianship provisions in 2011.
1. Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 680, § 1, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 680.
2. Id. § 11.
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The 2013 legislature will then have the opportunity to make certain eve-
rything fits together nicely and that any substantive changes are properly
integrated into the Code. The entire Estates Code is then slated to be-
come effective on January 1, 2014.3
II. INTESTACY
Although most Texans die intestate,4 this fact did not lead the legisla-
ture to make changes to the Texas law of intestate succession and there
are no appellate cases to report.
III. WILLS
A. TESTAMENTARY INTENT
Although not legally required, it may be prudent practice to have the
testator initial or sign each page of the will to demonstrate that he in-
tended each page to be a part of his will. This practice will help the testa-
tor avoid the problem that arose in In re Estate of Romancik.5 In
Romancik, the testator signed the third page of his will but did not sign
the prior pages. The will left his entire estate to his mother, but the testa-
tor's wife claimed that the testator's signature on page three was insuffi-
cient to demonstrate that he had testamentary intent with respect to the
prior pages. Both the trial court and the El Paso Court of Appeals re-
jected the wife's claim by holding that the testator's signature on page
three of the will reflected the testator's testamentary intent.6
B. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
The testator in the case of In re Estate of Tyner had three children, two
biological and one adopted.7 The testator's will defined "children" by
naming only his two biological children and the term "descendants" to
include those two children and their descendants. A later provision fur-
ther defined "descendants" by indicating that descendants included
adopted descendants. The biological child of the testator's predeceased
adopted child argued that this later provision brought her within the
scope of the term "descendants." However, both the trial court and the
Tyler Court of Appeals rejected her claim.8
The court of appeals studied these two provisions and concluded that
3. Id. § 12.
4. See, e.g., Where There's a Will, There's a Way, YOUR LAW, Spring 1988, at 3 (70%
of individuals do not have wills); Isn't It Time You Wrote a Will?, 50 CONSUMER REP. 103,
103 (1985) ("more than two-thirds of all adult Americans die without wills"); EUGENE
SCOLES & EDWARD HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENT'S ESTATES
AND TRUSTS 13 (4th ed. 1987) ("Despite the reasons for disposing of one's property by will
or even by trust, most Americans die intestate.").
5. 281 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.).
6. Id. at 594-95, 597.
7. 292 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2009, no pet. h.).
8. Id. at 181-83.
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they were unambiguous.9 The first provision defined the individuals who
would be deemed descendants (that is, the two named biological children
and their descendants).10 The second provision expanded on the type of
individuals who could qualify as their descendants, that is, both biological
and adopted individuals." Accordingly, a child of the testator's adopted
child could not fit within the class of individuals encompassed by the term
"descendants" in the testator's will.12
This case teaches that a definition of a term in a will such as "children"
or "descendants" should expressly state which individuals are included as
well as which individuals are not included to avoid construction issues. In
this case, the testator should have included statements such as "X, my
adopted son, is not included in the definition of 'child"' and "Descend-
ants of X are not included as my descendants."
C. CONTRACTUAL WILLS
If a testator desires to make a contractual will, the testator must com-
ply with the requirements of Probate Code section 59A by either (1) stat-
ing that a contract exists and stating the material provisions of the
contract, or (2) executing a written agreement that is otherwise binding
and enforceable.' 3 Ray v. McMaster, a case where a husband and his wife
executed reciprocal wills, demonstrates the problem that arises if the ma-
terial provisions of the contract are not stated.14 The provision at issue
provided:
8. Contract With Spouse. I hereby declare that I have an oral and/or
written agreement with my spouse as to the disposition which may be
made of my property, any property taken under this Will or my
spouse's property upon the death of either of us. We have identical,
or legally similar Wills, intending thereby to be contractually
bound.' 5
Each will named the other spouse as the primary beneficiary, and if the
spouse predeceased, then a nephew was the beneficiary. After the wife
died, the husband executed a new will naming a niece as the primary
beneficiary. After the husband died, the nephew claimed that the origi-
nal will was contractual and that the husband breached its terms by nam-
ing the niece as the beneficiary. The trial court agreed.16
However, the Houston First Court of Appeals reversed.' 7 The court of
appeals studied Probate Code section 59A and held that the reciprocal
9. See id. at 183.
10. Id. at 182.
11. Id. at 182-83.
12. Id. at 183.
13. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A (Vernon Supp. 2009).
14. 296 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
15. Id. at 348.
16. Id. at 346-47.
17. Id. at 350.
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wills did not meet the requirements of the statute.18 The nephew asserted
that the wills satisfied Probate Code section 59A(a)(2), 19 which provides
that a contract can be established by "provisions of a will stating that a
contract does exist and stating the material provisions of the contract." 20
The court explained that although the will did state that a contract ex-
isted, it failed to state the material provisions of that contract.21 The wills
did not recite the consideration to support the contract and did not pro-
vide that they could be modified or revoked only upon mutual consent.22
D. IN TERROREM PROVISONS
Dicta in Calvery v. Calvery23 has caused uncertainty in Texas as to
whether a no contest clause would be enforced to cause a beneficiary who
contests a will to forfeit his or her gift if the beneficiary (1) had probable
cause for bringing the action and (2) was in good faith in bringing and
maintaining the action. The 2009 legislature resolved this issue by codify-
ing the good faith-probable cause exception to the enforceability of in
terrorem provisions in Probate Code section 64.24
Some testators may wish to trigger a forfeiture even if their wills are
contested with probable cause and in good faith. Before the new statute,
these testators would state their intent, and from that statement, there
was a good chance the court would carry out their intent. This approach
is now problematic. Perhaps a "reverse" approach would work. For ex-
ample, "If X does not contest this will, X receives [gift]." Instead of a
condition subsequent which takes away something already given if the
condition is breached (that is, a forfeiture), this type of provision creates




The jurisdiction provisions of Probate Code sections 4, 5, and 5A were
repealed and replaced with new sections 4A-4H. 25 For the most part, the
rules remain the same, and were merely reorganized to make them easier
to understand. However, there are some significant changes, which are
noted below:
18. Id. at 347-49.
19. Id. at 348, 349.
20. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
21. Ray, 296 S.W.3d at 349.
22. Id. at 348.
23. See 55 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. 1932, opinion adopted).
24. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 64 (Vernon Supp. 2009). Section 64 only applies to the
estates of decedents who died on or after the date of enactment, that is, June 19, 2009.
Thus, the existence of this exception remains unclear with respect to estates of testators
who included no contest provisions in their wills and died before June 19, 2009.
25. Act of June 1, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, § 12(b), (h), 2009 Tex. Gen Laws
4273, 4275 (repealing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 4-5A).
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* A detailed definition of the types of actions included within the
penumbra of a "probate proceeding" or "probate matter" was added
to clarify the types of issues that a court with jurisdiction over a case
may resolve.26 The jurisdictional statutes no longer use the phrase
"appertaining to an estate or incident to an estate." 27
* The jurisdiction of a county court at law exercising probate juris-
diction was expanded to include the interpretation and administra-
tion of a testamentary trust, if the will creating the trust was admitted
to probate in that court. 2 8
* If a probate action is contested in a county with no statutory pro-
bate court or county court at law exercising probate jurisdiction, and
that action is transferred to a district court, the district court may
hear any matter related to the probate proceeding brought subse-
quently.29 The district court may, either on its own or upon the mo-
tion of an interested party, determine that the matter is not contested
and transfer it to the constitutional county court that has
jurisdiction.30
* If a probate action is contested in a county with no statutory pro-
bate court or county court at law exercising probate jurisdiction, and
a statutory probate judge is assigned to hear the case, then any other
contested matter filed after the assignment must also be assigned to
the same statutory probate judge.31
* If a probate action filed in the constitutional county court is con-
tested in a county with a county court at law exercising probate juris-
diction and only the contested matter is transferred to that county
court at law, the county court at law must now return the case to the
constitutional county court once the contested matter is resolved.32
* A statutory probate court now has jurisdiction, concurrent with
the district court, over a wider range of matters such as actions in-
volving inter vivos trusts and matters involving powers of attorney.33
B. WILL CONTEST STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Probate Code section 93 lays out the statutorily-mandated time period
to contest a will that has been admitted to probate. 34 Failure to contest
the will in a timely manner will be fatal to even a winning argument, as
shown in Stoll v. Henderson.35 In Stoll, the testatrix executed a will and
codicil, then revoked those documents and executed another will that
provided for a significantly different disposition of her property. Subse-
26. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(bb) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2009).
27. Compare Act of May 28, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1060, §2(h), 2003 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3052, 3053, repealed by Act of June 1, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, § 4H(h), 2009
Tex. Gen. Laws 4273, 4279, with TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 4H (Vernon Supp. 2009).
28. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 4B(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
29. Id. § 4D(g) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 4D(h).
32. Id. § 4E(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
33. Id. §§ 4GH (Vernon Supp. 2009).
34. Id. § 93 (Vernon 2003).
35. 285 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet. h.).
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quently, she then revoked her new will.36
The probate court admitted the testatrix's initial will and codicil to pro-
bate.37 Two years and five months later, a contestant attempted to set
aside this probate by showing that the testatrix had revoked these docu-
ments.38 The Houston First Court of Appeals held that her initial will
and codicil were effective to dispose of her property. 39 The court rea-
soned that the contestant was attempting to contest the testatrix's will
after the two-year contest period under Probate Code section 93 had ex-
pired, and thus, the contest was ineffective.40
If the contest had been timely filed, it is likely that the contestant's
argument would have succeeded. Texas courts have held that a revoca-
tion of a will is effective immediately and that a revoked will is not re-
vived by the revocation of the second will.4 1 Under these facts, the
application of the Texas "no revival" approach would dictate that the tes-
tatrix died intestate, causing the court to hold as it did.
C. CONTENTS OF APPLICATIONS TO PROBATE WILLS
The information about the testator's prior marriages that must be con-
tained in an application to probate a will has been changed. Previously,
all of the testator's prior divorces needed to be disclosed 42 Now, how-
ever, only marriages that were dissolved after the will was executed need
to be revealed. 43 In addition to describing divorces, the applicant must
also describe annulments and declarations of void marriages. 44
D. APPEAL
Two cases address issues that arise during the appeal of a probate mat-
ter. In Pollard v. Pollard, the Dallas Court of Appeals determined that
the probate court's order, striking a creditor's petition and dismissing his
claims in an independent administration with prejudice, was an interlocu-
tory order and thus not appealable.45 In coming to this conclusion, the
court applied the test set forth in Crowson v. Wakeham.46 The court first
explained that there was no express statute resolving finality of the dis-
36. Id. at 100-02.
37. Id. at 102.
38. Id. at 102, 105.
39. See id. at 106.
40. Id. at 105-06.
41. See Hawes v. Nicholas, 10 S.W. 558, 560 (Tex. 1889) ("A written declaration, prop-
erly executed, as effectually revokes a will from the date of its execution as does its
destruction.").
42. Act of March 16, 1955, 54th Leg., R.S., ch. 55, §81(a)(8), 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 88,
114, repealed by Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 633, §1(a)(8), 2009 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1416, 1416.
43. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 81(a)(8), 89A (Vernon Supp. 2009). Section 81(a)(8)
governs applications for letters testamentary, and section 89A governs applications to pro-
bate a will as a muniment of title. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 81(a)(8), 89A.
44. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 81(a)(8), 89A.
45. 285 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
46. 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995).
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missal order and then determined that the executor's counterclaim
against the creditor was part of the same phase of the proceeding. 47 Ac-
cordingly, the court had no jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 4 8 As the
court in Crowson recommended, to resolve doubt, a party wishing to ap-
peal should seek a severance order and, assuming it is granted, file a
timely appeal. 4 9
The decision in In re Estate of Washington demonstrates that an award
or denial of attorney's fees is a final and appealable order.50 In that case,
a removed executor unsuccessfully petitioned the trial court for attor-
ney's fees from the estate.5 1 The Texarkana Court of Appeals deter-
mined that it had jurisdiction to hear the former executor's appeal, and
that a request for attorney's fees was a claim against the decedent's es-
tate.5 2 Probate Code section 312(d) provides that a court's order approv-
ing or disapproving the request has "the force and effect of [a] final
judgment[ ]."53 Accordingly, the trial court's order was final and
appealable.54
E. BILL OF REVIEW
Buck v. Estate of Buck provides a detailed and important examination
of the use of a bill of review in a probate proceeding.55 Buck dealt with a
grandson who wanted to overturn the probate of his grandmother's will
and instead probate an alleged later will, in which he was named the sole
beneficiary. After enduring considerable questionable behavior by the
grandson, the probate court sanctioned him by striking his pleadings and
imposing other sanctions.5 6 The grandson then filed a bill of review to set
aside the sanctions and a motion to admit the later will to probate. The
probate court denied both motions, the grandson appealed, and the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed.57
The court explained that the purpose of a bill of review is to revise and
correct errors, not to set aside a probate court's orders, decisions, or judg-
ments.58 The court enumerated the three elements of a bill of review
under Probate Code section 31.s9 First, the applicant must be an inter-
ested person.60 The grandson was an interested person because he had a
47. Pollard, 285 S.W.3d at 151-52.
48. Id. at 152.
49. See Crowson, 897 S.W.2d at 783.
50. 289 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, pet. denied).
51. Id. at 365.
52. Id. at 365-66.
53. Id. (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 312(d) (Vernon 2003)).
54. Id.
55. 291 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no pet. h.).
56. Id. at 50-52.
57. Id. at 50-52, 60.
58. Id. at 52 (quoting Nadolney v. Taub, 116 S.W.3d 273, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)).




pecuniary interest that was affected by the probate action. 6' Second, the
applicant must file the bill of review within two years, which the grandson
had done.62 Third, the applicant must prove that the probate court made
a substantial error, which was the crux of this case. 63
There are two types of substantial errors. The first type occurs when
the court "acted in direct derogation of a specific, non-discretionary, pro-
vision of the probate code."6 The grandson alleged that under Probate
Code section 83(a), the court should have considered both probate appli-
cations on the merits rather than imposing discovery sanctions which re-
sulted in taking one application out of contention.65 The appellate court
rejected this argument by determining that this provision does not trump
discovery rules because to do so would prevent the probate court from
sanctioning discovery abuse. 66 The Probate Code does not contain a pro-
vision indicating that section 83 prevails over the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.67 Without such a specific mandate, the Civil Procedure rules
control. 68
The second type of substantial error occurs when the court improperly
performs a discretionary act.6 9 The grandson alleged that the probate
court's act of dismissing his pleadings, that is, imposing the "death pen-
alty" sanction, was an improper act.70 The court reviewed the record and
concluded that the probate court did not abuse its discretion by acting
without reference to guiding rules and principles when it dismissed the
grandson's pleadings.7'
F. SETTING ASIDE PROBATE OF WILL AS A MUNIMENT OF TITLE
A person who does not want a will admitted to probate as a muniment
of title should object during the probate action rather than waiting until a
later time. Otherwise, the result will be like that in the case of In re Es-
tate of Jones.72 After the testator died, her husband probated her will as a
muniment of title. Almost two years later, the testator's daughter filed an
application to set aside the probate, alleging that some of the devised
property was not in the testator's estate at the time of her death and also
that unpaid debts existed at the time of probate. The trial court rejected






66. Id. at 54.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 55.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 60.
72. 286 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet. h.).
73. Id. at 99, 102.
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The court explained that the daughter's action was not a will contest
governed by the two-year statute of limitations in Probate Code section
93, because she was not attempting to show that the testator's will was
invalid.7 4 The court also determined that the daughter did not show that
the trial court made a substantial error by admitting the will to probate,
and thus, she was not entitled to a bill of review under Probate Code
section 31.75 The allegation that unpaid debts may have existed would
not have caused the trial court's order to be a substantial error, because
the court referenced Probate Code section 89C, which also allows a will
to be probated as a muniment of title "for other reason" if it determines
that there is no necessity for an administration. 76
G. REMOVAL OF EXECUTOR
The Supreme Court of Texas, in Kappus v. Kappus, made an important
distinction between a court's discretion to refuse to appoint a named ex-
ecutor and a court's discretion to remove an executor already in office.77
The beneficiaries' mother (the testator's ex-wife) moved to have the inde-
pendent executor removed from office because he shared ownership of
certain estate property with his deceased brother and allegedly had a con-
flict of interest with the beneficiaries. The mother argued that he could
not adequately represent the estate while seeking to retain his own share
of the property. The trial court, however, denied the motion.78
The Tyler Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that great deference is
given to the testator's choice of an independent executor.79 However, the
named executor may be removed for the reasons specified in Probate
Code section 149C.80 In this case, the estate and the executor were in
conflict regarding a 4.86% interest in the property because both claimed
ownership to this property.81 The court concluded that the existence of
this conflict required the trial court to remove the executor. 8 2
The Texas Supreme Court reversed.83 The supreme court examined
section 149C and pointed out that "conflict of interest," either actual or
potential, is not one of the listed grounds for removal. 84 The supreme
court explained that being in a conflict situation is not the same as misap-
plication, embezzlement, gross misconduct, gross mismanagement, or be-
ing incapacitated.85
74. Id. at 100.
75. Id. at 100-01.
76. Id. at 101 (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89C(a) (Vernon 2007)).
77. 284 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. 2009).
78. Id. at 833-834.
79. In re Estate of Kappus, 242 S.W.3d 182, 190-92 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007, pet.




83. Kappus v. Kappus, 284 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tex. 2009).
84. Id. at 835.
85. Id. at 835-38.
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The supreme court noted that a trial court has broad discretion to dis-
qualify a person as being "unsuitable" pre-appointment, but once a per-
son is appointed, the only grounds for removal are expressly stated in the
statute. 86 Because the mother did not prove one of the enumerated re-
moval grounds, the removal was improper.87
H. INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION
Eastland v. Eastland demonstrates that being a beneficiary of an estate
or having other dealings with the decedent or the decedent's estate is not
sufficient, in and of itself, to make the beneficiary unsuitable to serve as a
personal representative.88 The court appointed the named successor as
independent executor after the primary independent executor died. 89
The successor's brother, a beneficiary, appealed, claiming that the court
should not have appointed this successor. The brother alleged that the
successor was unsuitable for the position because the successor, a lawyer,
had provided legal advice to the primary executor, his mother, and that
some of this advice could have involved transactions that were a breach
of his fiduciary duties. In addition, he alleged that the successor was in-
volved in many matters regarding the estate.90 The Houston Fourteenth
Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence and determined that none of
these conflicts amounted to "a conflict of interest involving ownership
claims by him of estate property adverse to the clear pronouncements of
the will or to the best interests of the estate."91
Another issue in Eastland involved the validity of the probate court's
appointment of the successor executor even though the notice require-
ments of Probate Code section 220(a) were not followed.92 The appellate
court held that section 220(a) applies only to dependent administrations
and not to independent administrations.93 The court explained that al-
though the term "personal representative" in section 220(a) would en-
compass an independent executor, section 3(aa) states that the expansive
definition "shall not be held to subject such representatives to control of
the courts in probate matters with respect to settlement of estates except
as expressly provided by law." 94 Section 220(a) does not expressly in-
clude independent executors, and thus, the section was inapplicable. 95 In
addition, the court explained, under existing cases it is clear that re-
moval-and hence appointment of an independent executor-is control
with respect to the settlement of the estate. 96 The court's decision is also
86. Id. at 835.
87. See id. at 839.
88. 273 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
89. Id. at 817.
90. Id. at 817-19, 828.
91. Id. at 828.
92. Id. at 818, 822.
93. See id. at 826.
94. Id. at 821.
95. Id. at 825.
96. See id. at 823-25.
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supported by the legislative purpose behind independent administrations,
which is for the courts to take a "hands-off" approach unless the Probate
Code provides otherwise.97
I. ArrORNEY 'S FEES
Appellate courts are reluctant to overturn a trial court's failure to
award attorney's fees when such an award is discretionary without a clear
showing that the judge abused his or her discretion.98 For example, in In
re Estate of Washington, the trial court removed the wife as the depen-
dent executor of her husband's estate.99 The wife then asked the court to
order her husband's estate to reimburse her for the attorney's fees she
incurred in defending (1) the removal action and (2) an action to amend
or construe a provision of her husband's will. The trial court denied both
requests, and the wife appealed.100
The Texarkana Court of Appeals began by explaining that the wife's
request for attorney's fees did not fall within the purview of the portion
of Probate Code section 243 which requires the court to award fees if the
fees are incurred either to (1) probate the will or (2) preserve, safe-keep,
or manage the estate.101 The action to amend or construe the will was
not an attack on the will.10 2 Instead, it was an action to correct an alleged
scrivener's error.103 Likewise, defending a removal action is not an ac-
tion to preserve, safe-keep, or manage the estate. 04 Consequently, an
award of attorney's fees was discretionary.10s The court of appeals af-
firmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied the wife's request for attorney's fees.' 06
J. NOTATION OF PROBATE MATTERS
Throughout the Probate Code, references to noting probate matters in
the "minutes" of the court were replaced with references to the "judge's
probate docket." 07
97. Id. at 825.
98. See In re Estate of Washington, 289 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, pet.
denied).
99. Id. at 364-65.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 367-68.
102. Id. at 368.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 369.
105. Id. at 368.
106. Id. at 371.
107. Compare Act of May 5, 1971, 62d Leg., R.S., ch. 173, §9, sec. 95(d)(1)-(2), 1971
Tex. Gen. Laws 967, 978 (amended 2009) (current version at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.





The legislature made a significant change to the way a marital estate
that makes an economic contribution to property owned by another mari-
tal estate determines the amount of its claim for reimbursement with re-
spect to the benefited estate upon the death of a spouse. Essentially, the
prior scheme was based on a complex statutory formula for determining
economic contribution. 0 8 Amendments to Family Code sections
3.401-3.410 adopt instead an equitable reimbursement approach and pro-




1. Fraud and Undue Influence
A trial court's finding of fraud, duress, or undue influence will be diffi-
cult to set aside on appeal, as demonstrated in Cooper v. Cochran.110
Both the trial court and the Dallas Court of Appeals agreed that an inter
vivos trust was invalid because the settlor was induced to enter into the
trust by fraud, duress, and undue influence.' 1 With regard to the fraud
claim, the evidence showed that the settlor placed property into the trust
for the beneficiary in exchange for the beneficiary's (grandson's) promise
to take care of the settlor (grandmother).'1 2 Further, the evidence re-
vealed that the grandson never intended to take care of the settlor.113
Regarding the duress and undue influence assertions, the evidence re-
vealed that the grandson told the settlor that "she would never see the
light of day" and that he would "put her in an insane asylum" if she did
not sign the trust.114 This, coupled with the fact that the settlor was eld-
erly, living alone, and needed assistance, was sufficient evidence to sup-
port the trial court's finding of duress and undue influence.115
2. Deceased Person as Beneficiary
Complex land transactions can trigger disputes many decades later.
Accordingly, great care needs to be taken to be sure "simple" mistakes
108. See Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 838, § 2, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1679,
1681, amended by Act of May 28, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 230, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws
1056, 1056, repealed by Act of May 29, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 768, § 11(3), 2009 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1950, 1953.
109. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.401-3.410 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2009).
110. 288 S.W.3d 522, 532 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet. h.) (restating Cooper v.
Cochran, 272 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet. h.), which was withdrawn after
the court learned that Cooper filed for bankruptcy during the pendency of the appeal ren-
dering the court's original opinion void).
111. Id. at 532-34.
112. Id. at 532.





are not made, such as naming a deceased person as the beneficiary of a
trust, as was done in Longoria v. Lasater.116 In 1924, a partition agree-
ment and decree created a trust of real property in favor of named bene-
ficiaries. A disagreement arose over a 1950 deed that covered the same
property: did the 1950 deed (1) continue the 1924 trust or (2) create a
new trust? The San Antonio Court of Appeals determined that because
one of the beneficiaries of the 1924 trust died prior to the 1950 deed, his
portion of the property was not covered by the 1950 deed.117 The court
relied on established Texas law, as well as the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts, and held that a person cannot be a beneficiary of a trust if that
person dies prior to the date of trust creation.118 Therefore, the 1950
deed did not create a trust with regard to the predeceased beneficiary's
portion of the 1924 trust, and the appellants could not prevail because the
alleged trustees held the property either free of trust or as a resulting
trust."9
B. TRUSTEES
In Ditta v. Conte, the Texas Supreme Court held that a person dissatis-
fied with the conduct of a trustee may bring suit for removal no matter
how long it has been since the alleged improper conduct occurred. 120 The
probate court in Ditta removed the trustee from office, and the trustee
appealed, claiming that the removal action was barred by the four-year
statute of limitations governing breach of fiduciary-duty claims because
the underlying reason for the removal was for an alleged breach of duty.
The Houston First Court of Appeals agreed that the removal action was
barred because it was brought more than four years after the accrual of
the removal action. 121
The supreme court reversed, holding that "no statutory limitations pe-
riod restricts a court's discretion to remove a trustee." 122 "A limitations
period, while applicable to suits seeking damages for breach of fiduciary
duty, has no place in suits that seek removal rather than recovery."123
The supreme court studied Trust Code section 113.082(a), which grants a
court broad discretion to remove a trustee for certain enumerated con-
duct as well for any "other cause" the court finds sufficient to justify re-
moval.124 The supreme court stressed that a decision to remove "turns on
the special status of the trustee as a fiduciary and the ongoing relation-
ship between trustee and beneficiary, not on any particular or discrete act
of the trustee."1 25
116. 292 S.W.3d 156, 166-67 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet. denied).
117. Id. at 159-60, 166.
118. Id. at 166-67.
119. Id. at 168.
120. 298 S.W.3d 187, 192-93 (Tex. 2009).
121. Id. at 189.
122. Id. at 192-93.
123. Id. at 188.





Gammill v. Fettner reminds litigants that in counties with both a statu-
tory probate court and a district court, trust litigation may proceed in
either court, since they have concurrent jurisdiction. 1 2 6 In Gammill, tes-
tamentary trust litigation occurred in a district court, but because there
was also a statutory probate court in the county, appellants in the case
claimed that the district court lacked jurisdiction. 127
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals began its analysis by ex-
plaining that under Trust Code section 115.001(d) and Probate Code sec-
tion 5(e) (now section 4H), the statutory probate court had concurrent
jurisdiction.12 8 Thus, the district court had the ability to hear the case,
even though the statutory probate court also had jurisdiction and the case
was appertaining or incident to a decedent's estate.129
D. TERMINATION
Shortly after a trust terminated, the trustee in Myrick v. Enron Oil &
Gas Co. executed an oil and gas lease covering a portion of the trust
property that had been negotiated before the trust ended.1 30 The trustee
later distributed this property to the trust's beneficiary after the benefici-
ary signed a document releasing the trustee from any liability for its acts
as a trustee up to the time of the distribution. The beneficiary later sued
the trustee, alleging it had breached its fiduciary duties by entering into
the lease. The trustee responded by claiming that it had the authority to
enter into the lease by pointing to both an exculpatory clause in the trust
and the release which the beneficiary had signed with full knowledge of
the allegedly improper lease. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the trustee, holding that the lease was proper and that the
beneficiary's claims were barred by the trust's exculpatory clause, the
beneficiary's release, and the statute of limitations.131 The beneficiary
appealed.132
The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed.' 3 3 The court focused on Trust
Code section 112.052, which provides that "the trustee may continue to
exercise the powers of the trustee for the reasonable period of time re-
quired to wind up the affairs of the trust and to make distribution of its
assets to the appropriate beneficiaries."1 3 4 The court explained that be-
cause of litigation involving the trust, the trustee could not immediately
distribute the property.'35 Thus, entering into the previously negotiated
126. 297 S.W.3d 792, 798-801 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet. h.).
127. Id. at 798-99.
128. Id. at 798-801.
129. Id. at 801.
130. 296 S.W.3d 724, 725-26 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2009, no pet. h.).
131. Id. at 726.
132. Id. at 725-26.
133. Id. at 729.
134. Id. at 728 (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.052 (Vernon 2007)).
135. Id. at 728
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lease only two months after the trust's termination and before the litiga-
tion was resolved was not in breach of the trustee's duties.136 In fact, the
trustee had a duty to continue managing the property and to seek the best
possible result for the beneficiary.137 Nonetheless, to avoid later dis-
putes, a trustee should wrap up the trust as promptly as possible, making
as few major investments as is reasonably prudent during the "gap"
period.
E. IN TERROREM PROVISIONS
To be consistent with new Probate Code section 64, the legislature en-
acted Trust Code section 112.038, which provides that a no-contest clause
is unenforceable if "(1) probable cause exists for bringing the action; and
(2) the action was brought and maintained in good faith."138 The unen-
forceability of in terrorem provisions under these circumstances cannot be
changed by the settlor under new Trust Code section 111.0035(b)(6).1 39
F. DISCLAIMERS
The list of individuals who may disclaim a trust interest was modified to
include an independent administrator.140 Although the Probate Code de-
fines "independent executor" to include "independent administrator" in
section 3(q),141 no similar definition exists in the Trust Code, which trig-
gered uncertainty as to whether an independent administrator could dis-
claim a trust interest.
G. GRANT OF DISCRETION
The legislature added Trust Code section 113.029(a) to codify the com-
mon-law rule that regardless of the extent of discretion the settlor grants
to a trustee, the trustee must always act "in good faith and in accordance
with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the benefi-
ciaries."1 42 Thus, even if the settlor provides that the trustee's discretion
is "absolute" or "uncontrolled," the trustee's actions must still comport
with fiduciary standards and are reviewable by the court.143
H. SAVINGS PROVISION FOR NON-HEMs DISTRIBUTIONS
Tax problems may result if a non-settlor beneficiary is also the trustee
of a trust and is given the power to make self-distributions that are not
limited by an ascertainable standard relating to health, education, sup-
136. Id.
137. Id. The court did not rule on the validity of the trust's exculpatory clause or the
beneficiary's release because it determined that the lease was not in breach of the trustee's
duties. Id.
138. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.038 (Vernon Supp. 2009).
139. Id. § 111.0035(b)(6) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
140. Id. § 112.010(c)(3), (c-1) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
141. TEx. PROB. CODE Am. § 3(q) (Vernon Supp. 2009).




port, or maintenance. A settlor may create this problem inadvertently by
giving the trustee-beneficiary unrestricted discretion or limiting distribu-
tions to a standard that is not ascertainable, such as for the trus-
tee-beneficiary's comfort, benefit, or well-being.
To remedy this problem, the legislature provided that in such situa-
tions, the trustee-beneficiary's power to distribute is "cut back" to an
ascertainable standard relating to health, education, support, or mainte-
nance.144 Likewise, the trustee-beneficiary's power to distribute is re-
stricted so that distributions cannot be made to satisfy a legal obligation
of support that the trustee-beneficiary personally owes to another
person.14 5
If there are other trustees besides the beneficiary, a majority of the
remaining trustees may exercise the power to make discretionary distri-
butions to the "limited" trustee-beneficiary without regard to the cut-
back.14 6 If there is no trustee who is not free of restrictions, the court
may appoint a special fiduciary with authority to exercise the power.14 7
The automatic cut-back will not apply if one of the following circum-
stances exists:
* The trust was created and became irrevocable before September
1, 2009.148
* The settlor is the beneficiary-trustee. 1 4 9
* The settlor expressly indicated that the cut-back provisions of this
section do not apply.150
* The trustee-beneficiary is the settlor's spouse, and a marital de-
duction was previously allowed for in the trust.15
* The settlor may amend or revoke the trust.15 2
* Contributions to the trust qualify for the gift tax annual
exclusion.15 3
I. HOMESTEAD IN TRUST
The legislature provided that if a settlor transfers property to a "quali-
fying trust" (basically a revocable inter vivos trust) that otherwise would
qualify as the homestead of the settlor or the beneficiary had it not been
transferred into the trust, this property may still qualify as the settlor's or
beneficiary's homestead if the person occupies and uses it as his or her
144. Id. § 113.029(b)(1).
145. Id. § 113.029(b)(2).
146. Id. § 113.029(c).
147. Id.
148. Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 672, § 10(a), 2009 Tex. Gen Laws 1497,
1500. If the trust was created before September 1, 2009 but did not become irrevocable
until September 1, 2009 or thereafter, the cut-back will apply. See id.
149. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.029(b)(1).
150. Id. §113.029(b).
151. Id. § 113.029(d)(1).
152. Id. § 113.029(d)(2).
153. Id. § 113.029(d)(3).
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homestead.154 Accordingly, the homestead does not lose the creditor
protection it normally would have, merely because the homestead prop-
erty is being held in trust form.
J. CHARITABLE TRUSTS
1. Relocation
The legislature enacted Trust Code section 113.029 to remedy the "or-
phan trust" problem, which is described in the analysis of S.B. 666 as
follows:
The "orphan trust" or charitable foundations[,] set up by donors who
have no heirs or other family that they wish to carry out their wills,
are often entrusted to lawyers or local banks who will keep the
money invested in the local community. However, when an attorney
retires or local banks are sold to multinational financial institutions,
the foundations are no longer run by the people and banks familiar
with the donors' specific wishes. The corporate trustees have wide
latitude to change the way the trust operates[] and to decide which
charities will receive grants[,] and thus the danger of distorting or
altogether ignoring the donor's intent is increased with each transac-
tion. Banks give fewer and smaller charitable gifts from the trusts
they manage, all the while increasing the foundation's assets[ ] and
increasing administrative fees that the banks charge to foundations
for the services they provide. Additionally, banks as trustees will
often provide grants which serve their own interests[ ] but that do
not honor the donor's favorite causes.... The consequences of char-
itable funds being moved and used as assets and revenue streams for
large financial institutions is that communities that stood to benefit
from the philanthropy of their citizens are denied the good works
and good will of the original donors.155
The statute provides that the location of a charitable trust's administra-
tion cannot be changed to an out-of-state location other than as (1) the
settlor provided in the trust or as (2) the court approves under the proce-
dure set forth in the statute.156
A trustee who wants to move the location out of Texas must first give
proper notice.1 57 If the settlor is alive and competent, the trustee must
consult with the settlor and submit the selection to the attorney gen-
eral.158 If the settlor is dead or incapacitated, then the trustee must pro-
pose a new location and submit the proposal to the attorney general.159
The trustee must then file an action in the appropriate court to get
permission to move the trust administration out of Texas.' 60 The court
154. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.0021 (Vernon Supp. 2009).
155. Senate Research Ctr., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 666, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
156. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.029(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
157. Id. § 113.029(c).
158. Id. § 113.029(c)(1).
159. Id. § 113.029(c)(2).
160. Id. § 113.029(d).
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may not authorize a relocation unless it finds that the charitable purposes
of the trust will not be impaired by the move.161
The statute grants the attorney general the power to enforce this sec-
tion.16 2 If a trustee does not comply with the statute, the court may re-
move the trustee and appoint a new trustee. 163 The court may also
charge the costs of the removal, including reasonable attorney's fees,
against the removed trustee.164
2. Venue
By including proceedings the attorney general may bring against a
charity for breach of fiduciary duty, the legislature expanded the attorney
general's ability to have venue in charitable trust matters in Travis
County.165 Prior to this change, this section applied only to actions
against a fiduciary or managerial agent of a charitable trust and not to the
charity itself.166
3. Attorney's Fees
Property Code section 123.006 was added specifically to clarify the cir-
cumstances in which the attorney general is or may be entitled to recover
court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.167
K. EXERCISE OF POWERS BY MULTIPLE TRUSTEES
The legislature expanded the ability of co-trustees to act if a co-trustee
is unable to participate in the performance of a trustee function.168 In
addition to the previous reasons for the need for prompt action, such as
to carry out the purposes of the trust and to avoid injury to the trust
property, the following two reasons were added: (1) to achieve the effi-
cient administration of the trust and (2) to avoid injury to a
beneficiary.169
L. ATrORNEY AD LiEM
A court now has the power to appoint an attorney ad litem to represent
any interest that the court considers necessary. 170 The attorney ad litem
is entitled to reasonable compensation for his or her services. 171
161. Id. § 113.029(e).
162. Id. § 113.029(f).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. § 123.005.
166. Act of May 12, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 172, § 4(a), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1885,
1886 (amended 2009) (current version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 123.005).
167. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 123.006 (Vernon Supp. 2009).
168. Id. § 113.085(d) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
169. Id.
170. Id. § 115.014(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
171. Id. § 115.014(e).
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M. GUARDIAN AD LITEM
The legislature made it clear that a guardian ad litem in a trust pro-
ceeding is entitled to reasonable compensation for his or her services as
determined by the court.172 The compensation is to be taxed as costs in
the proceeding. 173
N. DEFERRED COMPENSATION, ANNUITIES, AND SIMILAR PAYMENTS
Trust Code section 116.172 provides guidance for a trustee when allo-
cating receipts from deferred compensation plans, annuities, and similar
arrangements such as IRAs.174 Generally, each year receipts are allo-
cated to income until they total four percent of the asset's fair market
value. Amounts in excess of four percent are allocated to principal. This
plan, however, is problematic given Revenue Ruling 2006-26, which indi-
cates that if this type of provision controls, the qualified plan or IRA may
not qualify for marital deduction treatment.175 Accordingly, the legisla-
ture amended section 116.172 to include a marital deduction savings
clause that, in summary, requires the trustee to determine the internal
income of these assets that qualify for the marital deduction. 176
0. SECTION 867 MANAGEMENT TRUSTS
The legislature made a variety of enhancements to Probate Code sec-
tion 867 management trusts. Here are some of the significant changes:
* The court must appoint an attorney ad litem and, if necessary,
may also appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the
person who is alleged to be incapacitated. 77
* A non-financial institution trustee may be appointed if the value
of the trust is $150,000 or less.' 78 Previously, the threshold was only
$50,000.179
* A non-financial institution trustee may be appointed even if the
value of the trust exceeds $150,000 if there is no financial institution
in the geographic area that is willing to serve as the trustee.180
* The court may award compensation to the attorney who repre-
sents a person seeking the creation of a management trust. 81
* The trustee is no longer limited to receiving compensation on an
annual basis but may receive compensation at more frequent inter-
vals as approved by the court.182
172. Id. § 115.014(d).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 116.172 (Vernon 2007 & Supp. 2009).
175. Rev. Rul. 2006-26, 2006-1 C.B. 939.
176. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.172(h)-(k).
177. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 867(b-3) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
178. Id. § 867(d).
179. Act of May 22, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 994, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2162, 2162
(amended 2009) (current version at TEX. PRoB. CODE ANN. § 867(d)).
180. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 867(d).
181. Id. § 665B(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
182. Id. § 868(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
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* A procedure was established to permit the court to order the
transfer of funds in a management account to a subaccount of a
pooled income trust such as the Master Pooled Trust, which is oper-
ated by The Arc of Texas.183
VI. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. COMMUNITY PROPERTY SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENTS
In perhaps the most shocking case in this Survey article, Holmes v.
Beatty, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that community property held by
joint tenants automatically has the survivorship feature even if that fea-
ture is not expressly stated or intended by the spouses.'^ In Holmes, a
husband and wife held investment accounts with the designation "JT
TEN." The spouses signed the agreement but did not indicate whether
the account had, or did not have, the survivorship feature. The appellate
court held that these accounts did not have the survivorship feature be-
cause they did not include an express statement of the survivorship fea-
ture as required by Probate Code section 452.185
In a significant departure from established Texas law, the supreme
court determined that holding community property as joint tenants auto-
matically includes the survivorship feature and that the designation "JT
TEN" is an acceptable abbreviation.186 In so deciding, the supreme court
relied on the common law under which joint tenancies carried with them
the survivorship feature.' 87 However, the supreme court disregarded
long-established Texas law which requires that the survivorship be ex-
pressly stated.' 88
The supreme court based its conclusion on the allegedly "weaker" lan-
guage of Probate Code section 452, which does not require the survivor-
ship language to be stated in "substantially" the same manner provided in
the statute as does Probate Code section 439.189 The supreme court ex-
plained that "[p]recedent, trade usage, and seminal treatises make clear
that joint tenancies carry rights of survivorship."1 90
Also in Holmes, the supreme court held that merely changing the form
in which community property with survivorship rights is held is not suffi-
183. Id. § 868C (Vernon Supp. 2009); see also id. §§ 910-916 (Vernon Supp. 2009) (cre-
ating new Subpart I and governing the establishment of pooled trust subaccounts).
184. 290 S.W.3d 852, 857-59 (Tex. 2009).
185. Id. at 854, 857.
186. Id. at 857.
187. Id. at 858.
188. Id.; TEX. PROB. CODE AN. § 452 (Vernon 2003) (requiring community property
survivorship agreements to contain an express statement of the survivorship feature). But
cf. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(a) (Vernon 2003) (stating that survivorship in separate or
individual property cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the property is held in joint
ownership); Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 865 (Tex. 1990) (holding that extrinsic
evidence cannot be used to show a right of survivorship for joint bank accounts between
non-spouses).




cient to revoke the survivorship agreement.191 In Holmes, the married
couple owned stocks that clearly stated the spouses were holding them as
joint tenants with rights of survivorship. However, the spouses did not
sign the certificates. The appellate court held that their failure to sign the
certificates resulted in an invalid community property survivorship agree-
ment because Probate Code section 452 requires the agreement to be
signed by both spouses. 192
The supreme court reversed, explaining that the accounts from which
the stocks were issued were held as joint tenants and had the survivorship
feature. 193 The only ways for the spouses to terminate the survivorship
feature was through a subsequent written agreement or by disposing of
the assets. 194 The mere fact that the stock was issued out of the account
in certificate form did not act as a disposition of the property covered by
the agreement. 195
B. CONVENIENCE SIGNERS ON ACCOUNTS
The Legislature enacted new provisions to authorize convenience sign-
ers on accounts that are not expressly labeled as convenience accounts. 196
A person who opens a single-party or multiple-party account that is not
expressly deemed a convenience account under section 438A now has the
option of indicating a convenience signer who has the ability to make
withdrawals but does not have ownership or survivorship rights. 197 The
Uniform Single-Party or Multiple-Party Account Form was modified to
provide for convenience signers on all types of accounts.198
C. JOINT ACCOUNTS
Nipp v. Broumley serves as a reminder that a person opening a joint
account must trust the other party, because regardless of who owns the
funds in the account, any party can withdraw all of the funds.199 In Nipp,
the decedent, using her own funds, opened certificates of deposit (CDs)
payable to herself or her son. Shortly before the decedent's death, as she
was entering the hospice, her son cashed three of the CDs worth approxi-
mately $76,000. The decedent's daughter subsequently claimed that the
CDs were part of the decedent's estate. The trial court held that the son
owned the funds in the CDs because the son had the right to withdraw
the funds.200
191. Id. at 861-62.
192. Id. at 860.
193. Id. at 862.
194. Id. at 861; see also TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 455 (Vernon 2003).
195. Holmes, 290 S.W.3d at 862.
196. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 438B (Vernon Supp. 2009).
197. Id. § 438B(a)-(b)(1).
198. Id. § 439A (Vernon Supp. 2009).
199. 285 S.W.3d 552, 558-60 (Tex. App.-Waco 2009, no pet. h.).
200. Id. at 555.
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The Waco Court of Appeals reversed. 201 The court explained that the
right to withdraw is very different from ownership rights. 2 0 2 Each party
to a joint account has the right to withdraw the funds under Probate Code
section 445.203 However, ownership of account funds is based on a
party's net contributions under Probate Code section 438(a) unless there
is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 204
The son claimed that the decedent had gifted the CDs to him during
her lifetime.205 The court examined the basic elements of an inter vivos
gift-present donative intent, delivery, and acceptance-and determined
that the decedent did not have the intent to make a gift of the funds even
though she allowed the son to use the CDs as collateral for loans. 206 The
decedent retained control over the CDs, keeping them in a lock box in
her home until the son took them just days before her death and never
allowed the son to withdraw any of the funds.207
D. DESIGNATIONS OF GUARDIAN
The legislature has authorized a one-step execution procedure for both
a declaration of guardian by a parent for his or her children 208 and a self-
designation of guardian before the need arises.209 Instead of using the
traditional self-proving affidavit, which requires a "double" set of signa-
tures, statutory language may now be used that combines the execution,
attestation, and affidavit under one set of signatures. 210 This optional ex-
ecution method permits a streamlined execution procedure so that the
declarant and the witnesses need to sign only once.
E. ANATOMICAL Gwrs
The legislature enacted the 2006 version of the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act as Chapter 692A of the Health and Safety Code, replacing the
1968 version enacted in 1969 (Texas never adopted the 1987 version of
the Uniform Act).211 The revision modernizes the law regarding anatom-
ical gifts and makes it easier for a donor to make a gift. Significant
changes include the following:
* A donor card no longer needs two witnesses under most
circumstances. 212
201. Id. at 561.
202. Id. at 558.
203. Id. at 556.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 558
206. Id. at 558-59.
207. Id. at 559.
208. TEX PROB. CODE ANN. § 677A(a), (c) (Vernon 2009)
209. Id. § 679(a), (c) (Vernon 2009).
210. Id. §§ 677A(a), (c), 679(a), (c).
211. Act of May 18, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 186, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 534 (repealing
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692).
212. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692A.005 (Vernon Supp. 2009).
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* The methods by which a donor may make an anatomical gift
before death now include (1) an authorization of the gift in a donor
registry and (2) any form of communication made by the donor to
two adults, one being a disinterested witness, during terminal illness
or injury.213
* In addition to procedures for making an anatomical gift, there are
procedures for refusing to make an anatomical gift.2 14
* The decision of an adult or emancipated minor to be a donor or
to refuse to be a donor is strengthened. Absent subsequent revoca-
tion or a contrary indication, all other persons are barred from mak-
ing, amending, or revoking the (potential) donor's decision.215
* The list of priority persons authorized to make an anatomical gift
of a decedent's body has been expanded to include (1) an agent who
could have made the gift immediately preceding the decedent's
death, (2) adult grandchildren, (3) grandparents, (4) "an adult who
exhibited special care and concern for the decedent," and (5) hospi-
tal administrators.216 An agent who could have made the gift imme-
diately preceding death now has top priority for making the
anatomical gift decision; the remaining added classes have a lower
priority than a spouse, adult child, parent, or adult sibling.217 Fur-
thermore, whereas prior law prohibited an anatomical gift over the
known opposition of a member of the same or a higher priority class,
the new law allows for a majority of members of the priority class
who are "reasonably available" to make an anatomical gift over the
minority's objection.218
* There are no provisions allowing a donor to specify the physician
to perform procedures to make an anatomical gift. 2 1 9
* When a person makes an anatomical gift of his or her entire
body, the family does not have a right to use of the donor's body for
purposes of a funeral. 220
* It is now a class A misdemeanor to (1) sell or purchase a body
part for transplant or therapy if removal of the body part is intended
to occur after the person's death, or (2) intentionally alter, falsify,
conceal, or destroy a document of gift in exchange for financial
gain.221
* The Department of State Health Services is required to create
the Dawson Donate Life-Texas Registry, a statewide Internet regis-
213. Id. §§ 692A.005, 692A.007.
214. Id. § 692A.007.
215. Id. §§ 692A.007(d), 692A.008(a).
216. Id. § 692A.009(a).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 692A.009(b).
219. Act of May 18, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 685, § 1, sec. 692.006(d), 1989 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2230, 2995, repealed by Act of May 18, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 187, §11(2), 2009 Tex.
Gen. Laws 534, 549.
220. Compare TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 692A.014(h) (Vernon Supp.
2009), with Act of May 18, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 685, § 1, sec. 692.010(c), 1989 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2230, 2996, repealed by Act of May 18, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 187, §11(2), 2009 Tex.
Gen. Laws 534, 549.
221. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE Am. §§ 692A.016-.017 (Vernon Supp. 2009).
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try of organ, tissue, and eye donors.222
* When there is a conflict between the measures required by an
advanced medical directive and the measures necessary to ensure
medical suitability of organs for transplant or therapy, the prospec-
tive donor or the donor's agent and the attending physician must
confer to resolve the conflict.223 If a resolution cannot be reached,
the ethics or medical committee of the health care facility must initi-
ate an expedited review of the matter. 224
F. SIGNATURES ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
1. Digital and Electronic Signatures
The legislature has authorized new methods for a declarant, the wit-
nesses, and the notary to sign medical powers of attorney, directives to
physicians, and out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate orders: digital and elec-
tronic signatures. A digital signature is "an electronic identifier intended
by the person using it to have the same force and effect as the use of a
manual signature." 225 The digital signature is sufficient if it meets the
following requirements under Health & Safety Code section
166.011(a)(1) and is made on or after January 1, 2010: (1) uses an al-
gorithm approved by the Department of State Health Services (formerly
known as the Texas Department of Health); (2) is unique to the person
using it; (3) is capable of verification; (4) is under the sole control of the
person using it; (5) is linked to data in a manner that invalidates the digi-
tal signature if the data is changed; (6) persists with the document and not
by association in separate files; and (7) is bound to a digital certificate.226
An electronic signature is "a facsimile, scan, uploaded image, com-
puter-generated image, or other electronic representation of a manual
signature that is intended by the person using it to have the same force
and effect of law as a manual signature." 227 The electronic signature is
sufficient if it meets the following requirements under Health & Safety
Code section 166.011(a)(2) and is made on or after January 1, 2010: (1) is
capable of verification; (2) is under the sole control of the person using it;
(3) is linked to data in a manner that invalidates the electronic signature
if the data is changed; and (4) persists with the document and not by
association in separate files. 2 2 8
2. Notarization as Substitute for Attestation
In lieu of signing in the presence of two witnesses, the declarant may
now sign the directive and have the signature acknowledged before a no-
222. Id. § 692A.020.
223. Id. § 692A.021(b).
224. Id. § 692A.021(c).
225. Id. § 166.002(5-a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
226. Id. § 166.011(a)(1).
227. Id. § 166.002(5-b).




G. MALPRACTICE OUTSIDE OF ESTATE PLANNING CONTEXT
The Supreme Court of Texas held in Smith v. O'Donnell that a dece-
dent's claim for legal malpractice, regardless of whether it involves the
planning of the decedent's estate or some other legal matter, survives
and, thus, the decedent's personal representative may bring the claim.230
In Smith, the executor sued the decedent's former attorneys for malprac-
tice in advising the decedent in his capacity as the executor of his prede-
ceased wife's estate.231 The lower court ruled in favor of the attorneys,
basing its judgment on the fact that the decedent's executor and estate
lacked privity of contract with the attorneys.232 The supreme court
granted a petition for review without reference to the merits, vacated the
lower court's judgment, and remanded so the lower court could take into
account the holding in Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate,
Inc.233
On remand, the San Antonio Court of Appeals began its analysis by
holding that Belt was not limited to estate planning malpractice ac-
tions.234 Accordingly, the court explained that the executor stepped into
the decedent's shoes and could bring whatever malpractice action the de-
cedent could have brought while alive, even if it did not involve the plan-
ning of the decedent's estate. 235 The court relied on language in Belt
providing that "legal malpractice claims alleging pure economic loss sur-
vive in favor of a deceased client's estate." 236 The court then examined
the evidence and concluded that although there was no evidence that the
attorneys acted with malice or breached fiduciary duties, there was a tria-
ble issue as to what damages were attributable to the attorneys' acts.2 3 7
The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the
attorneys' acts amounted to malpractice, 238 and the attorneys
appealed. 239
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed.240 The supreme court agreed with
the court of appeals that the executor is in the same position as the dece-
dent.241 If the decedent had not died, the decedent could have brought
229. Id. §§ 166.032(b) (directives to physicians); 166.082(b) (out-of-hospital do-not-re-
suscitate orders); 166.154(b) (medical powers of attorney).
230. 288 S.W.3d 417, 421-23 (Tex. 2009).
231. Id. at 419-20.
232. Id. at 420.
233. Smith v. O'Donnell, 197 S.W.3d 394, 394 (Tex. 2006) (referencing Belt v. Oppen-
heimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. 2006)).
234. O'Donnell v. Smith, 234 S.W.3d 135, 144 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet.
granted), affd, Smith v. O'Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2009).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 143 (quoting Belt, 192 S.W.3d at 785).
237. Id. at 146, 147, 150.
238. Id. at 151.
239. Smith, 288 S.W.3d at 420-21.
240. Id. at 424.
241. Id. at 421.
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the malpractice action, and thus the executor may bring the action on the
decedent's behalf.2 4 2 The supreme court explained that the concerns
about third-party malpractice suits (e.g., by disgruntled beneficiaries) do
not apply in this type of case as the estate's suit is the same as the one the
client could have brought; the attorney-client relationship is not jeopard-
ized by the attorney considering the impact on a third party.2 4 3
VII. CONCLUSION
The new cases and legislation address a wide array of issues, some very
narrow and some with potentially broad impact. This article has already
discussed the practical application of the cases and statutes. It is also
important to understand some overarching principles that transcend indi-
vidual cases and statutes and form a pattern. Here are some examples of
patterns this author detected:
* The Texas Supreme Court has shown an increased interest in
cases relating to estate planning by deciding four significant cases
during the Survey period. 244
* Courts may ignore the law to do what they think yields a correct
result in a case at bar even though doing so sets bad precedent.2 4 5
* Texas courts are increasingly willing to sanction a breach of fidu-
ciary duty or allow a malpractice claim to proceed. 246
* A practitioner may reduce the chance of litigation by taking pre-
cautions which are not legally necessary. 247
* Requirements for the effectiveness of techniques or validity of
documents change rapidly.2 4 8
242. Id.
243. Id. at 421-23. The court did not address whether the attorneys' actions constituted
malpractice. See id. at 419. A two-judge dissent asserted that this case falls under the
Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996), rule, which precludes a malpractice action by
a non-client (e.g., an unhappy beneficiary) against the decedent's attorney for malpractice
because of lack of privity. Id. at 427-28.
244. See, e.g., Ditta v. Conte, 298 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. 2009); Holmes v. Beatty, 290 S.W.3d
852, 857-59 (Tex. 2009); Kappus v. Kappus, 284 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. 2009); Smith v.
O'Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2009).
245. See Holmes, 290 S.W.3d at 857-59 (statutory requirement of express survivorship
language to create community property survivorship agreement ignored).
246. See Ditta, 298 S.W.3d 187 (no statute of limitation on action to remove executor);
Smith, 288 S.W.3d 417 (survival of malpractice claims).
247. See, e.g., In re Estate of Romancik, 281 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, no
pet.) (testator should sign each page of the will); In re Estate of Tyner, 292 S.W.3d 179
(Tex. App.-Tyler 2009, no pet. h.) (testator should state exclusions when defining terms,
not just inclusions).
248. See e.g., TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN § 166.011 (Vernon Supp. 2009) (digi-
tal and electronic signatures on advance directives); id. at §§ 166.032(b), 166.082(b), &
166.154(b) (elimination of witnessing requirement on advance directives if notarized); id.
§ 692A.005 (witnesses no longer needed for most anatomical gift documents); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. §§ 81(a)(8), 89A (Vernon Supp. 2009) (contents of probate application); id.
§ 64 (codifying good faith/probable cause exception to the enforceability of no contest will
clauses).
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